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Rethinking the Tyranny of the Majority: The
Extra-Legal Consequences of Anti-gay
Ballot Measures
Amy L. Stone*
INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court held in
Obergefell v. Hodges that state bans on same-sex marriage are
unconstitutional, legalizing same-sex marriage across the
country.1 This case directly overturned the Ohio Definition of
Marriage Amendment, a 2004 initiated constitutional
amendment that 61% of voters passed.2 This initiative was one of
thirty ballot measures since 1998 that explicitly restricted
marriage to a “union of one male and female.” In addition, ballot
measures in states like Hawaii, Maine, Washington, and
Maryland permitted voters to veto existing same-sex marriage
laws or permit the legislature to make new laws against
same-sex marriage.3 These same-sex marriage bans fit into a
history of ballot measures on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) rights that began in the mid-1970s.4
Although Obergefell overturned same-sex marriage bans across
the country, other anti-gay and anti-transgender ballot measures
persist in the United States.
Since 1974, there have been over 175 ballot measures on
LGBT rights at the town, municipal, county, and state levels.5
These ballot measures are typically referendums on municipal or

* Associate Professor, Trinity University Department of Sociology and Anthropology.
Ph.D. 2006, University of Michigan. B.A. 1998, Amherst College. My research on anti-gay
ballot measures would not have been possible without funding from the Phil Zwickler
Memorial Research Grant and Trinity University.
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
2 Ohio Definition of Marriage, Amendment 1 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot
pedia.org/Ohio_Definition_of_Marriage,_Amendment_1_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/HU
S2-XZ9N].
3 2012 Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/2012_ballot_measures
[https://perma.cc/85LG-M8FL]. See generally Kathleen E. Hull, The Political Limits of the
Rights Frame: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage in Hawaii, 44 SOC. PERSP. 207 (2001).
4 See generally AMY L. STONE, GAY RIGHTS AT THE BALLOT BOX (2012).
5 See id. Over 100 additional referendums and initiatives have been attempted but
have been unsuccessful in making it to the ballot box due to pre-ballot judicial challenges
or ineffectual petition collection. Id.
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statewide nondiscrimination laws (40%) and ballot measures
about domestic partnerships or same-sex marriage (31%).6
Almost a quarter of the additional ballot measures are
legal-restrictive initiatives intending to restrict future
nondiscrimination laws and eliminate government support for
homosexuality more broadly.7
There are two central questions in the study of anti-gay
ballot measures. First, there is the question of whether these
referendums and initiatives are majoritarian tyranny due to the
low passage rate of ballot measures on civil rights.
Disproportionately, organized conservative movement actors
sponsor these ballot measures to oppose LGBT rights, although
many same-sex marriage bans were legislatively referred
initiatives. Rarely do LGBT organizers propose a vote on their
rights.8 Between 1974 and 2012, almost 70% of these ballot
measures resulted in either the repeal of a LGBT rights law or
the creation of a new anti-gay law.9 Although many of these
measures are challenged in post-ballot judicial review, the high
passage rate of said measures is used as evidence for the tyranny
of direct democracy for LGBT rights.
Second, this Article pushes beyond the question of legal
tyranny to the extra-legal consequences of anti-gay ballot
measures. Ballot measures impact the LGBT community in the
affected municipality or state, the broader LGBT movement, and
the psychological health of lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals.
In this Article, I extend the existing arguments that call for
stricter judicial scrutiny of referendums and initiatives to argue
for a more holistic understanding of anti-gay ballot measures
that accounts for the extra-legal impact of direct democracy on
the LGBT community, movement, and individual. I argue that
even when these referendums and initiatives do not result in
anti-gay outcomes at the ballot box, they tyrannize the LGBT
community.
Part I of this Article will provide a brief history of anti-gay
ballot measures from 1974 to 2012. Part II will consider the legal
literature on whether or not these ballot measures are
tyrannical. Part III will analyze the community, movement, and
psychological consequences of these ballot measures.

Amy L. Stone, Subject of Ballot Measure (unpublished chart) (on file with author).
Id.
See id. (documenting the number of ballot measures initiated by the LGBT
community).
9 Id. See generally STONE, supra note 4.
6
7
8
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BALLOT MEASURES
Ballot measures on LGBT rights emerged at the municipal
level as part of a reaction to the advances of the emerging gay
and lesbian movement. In the 1970s, the gay and lesbian
movement passed municipal nondiscrimination ordinances that
provided protections in housing, employment, and/or public
accommodations based on sexual orientation.10 By 1974, the
movement had successfully passed fourteen of these ordinances
in municipalities across the country with only routine
opposition.11 In 1974, Boulder, Colorado community members
collected petitions to put their ordinance up for referendum, but
the opposition was relatively unorganized and received little
national attention.12 It was not until 1977 that a conservative
anti-gay countermovement organized to oppose the growing
successes of the gay and lesbian movement.13
The Religious Right is a “broad coalition of profamily [sic]
organizations and individuals who have come together to
struggle for a conservative Christian vision in the political
realm.”14 The anti-gay Religious Right emerged within the New
Right from the rising involvement of evangelical Christians in
politics in the 1970s, specifically the beginning of the pro-life
movement in response to Roe v. Wade,15 the development of the
antifeminist movement to defeat the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA), and the mobilization to respond to the growth of the
lesbian and gay movement.16 Although not all campaign leaders
or actors involved in municipal or state ballot measures may
identify as members of the Religious Right, scholars consistently
analyze these campaigns as part of a broader movement agenda;
most campaigns are well-networked with national Religious
Right organizations and share master frames about LGBT rights
to sway public opinion.17 In general, the Religious Right is far
10 See
generally JAMES W. BUTTON ET AL., P RIVATE L IVES, PUBLIC
CONFLICTS: BATTLES OVER GAY RIGHTS IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (1997).
11 Id. at 69 (detailing the history of the ordinances). See generally Mary Bernstein,
Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Use of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay
Movement, 103 AM. J. SOC. 531 (1997) (analyzing the routine opposition against these
movements).
12 See STONE, supra note 4, at 13.
13 See BUTTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 68.
14 DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTIGAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE CHRISTIAN
RIGHT 9 (1997).
15 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16 See SARA DIAMOND, ROADS TO DOMINION: RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS AND
POLITICAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 161–64 (1995). See generally JEAN HARDISTY,
MOBILIZING RESENTMENT: CONSERVATIVE RESURGENCE FROM THE JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY
TO THE PROMISE KEEPERS (1999).
17 See generally KIMBERLY B. DUGAN, THE STRUGGLE OVER GAY, LESBIAN, AND
BISEXUAL RIGHTS: FACING OFF IN CINCINNATI (2005); TINA FETNER, HOW THE RELIGIOUS
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more successful in the arena of ballot measures than they are on
the legislative or judicial level.18 The movement also deploys
more radical claims about gay rights for a public audience than
they do for a judicial or legislative audience.19
In 1977, celebrity Anita Bryant, a former Miss America
contestant and spokesperson for Florida Orange Juice, led a
campaign against the Dade County, Florida nondiscrimination
ordinance.20 Bryant and the group Save Our Children,
Incorporated gained national attention with their rhetoric about
the dangers of gay rights, specifically their arguments about
religious rights and the influence on children, implying that gay
men were pedophiles looking to recruit children.21 Many scholars
point to the Dade County conflict and the national attention to
gay rights issues in 1977 for motivating an upsurge in lesbian
and gay activism across the country during this time.22 The form
of the Dade County ballot measure—reactive opposition to the
passage of pro-gay legislation—was the most common type of
anti-gay ballot measure during this time period.23
Shortly after Dade County’s ballot measure, California State
Senator John Briggs, who worked with Bryant on her campaign,
sponsored the California Defend Our Children Initiative, a
response to a 1975 California law that protected gay and lesbian
teachers from being fired.24 Popularly called the Briggs Initiative,
this new law would have required the firing of teachers who were
lesbian or gay, or who advocated homosexuality.25 Rather than a
referendum to overturn an existing law, this initiative was an
attempt to write a new, anti-gay law through the ballot measure
process.26 The Briggs Initiative was “[o]verwhelmingly opposed
by teachers’ unions and then-Governor Ronald Reagan” and lost
by a million votes.27
RIGHT SHAPED LESBIAN AND GAY ACTIVISM (2008); JOHN GALLAGHER & CHRIS BULL,
PERFECT ENEMIES: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, THE GAY MOVEMENT, AND THE POLITICS OF THE
1990S (1996); HARDISTY, supra note 16; HERMAN, supra note 14.
18 See ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 143–45 (2005); see also Regina
Werum & Bill Winders, Who’s “In” and Who’s “Out”: State Fragmentation and the
Struggle over Gay Rights, 1974-1999, 48 SOC. PROBS. 386, 400–02 (2001).
19 See Joseph Mello, Rights Discourse and the Mobilization of Bias: Exploring the
Institutional Dynamics of the Same-Sex Marriage Debates in America, 66 STUD. L. POL.
& SOC’Y 1, 2–3, 22 (2015).
20 See BUTTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 68.
21 See FRED FEJES, GAY RIGHTS AND MORAL PANIC: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S
DEBATE ON HOMOSEXUALITY 96 (2008).
22 See generally id.; FETNER, supra note 17.
23 See generally STONE, supra note 4.
24 HARDISTY, supra note 16, at 100.
25 Id.; FEJES, supra note 21, at 181–212.
26 HARDISTY, supra note 16, at 100; FEJES, supra note 21, at 181–212.
27 STONE, supra note 4, at 14.
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In the mid-1980s the Religious Right harnessed panic and
fear about AIDS to increase fundraising and anti-gay
animosity.28 In 1986, Lyndon LaRouche sponsored a statewide
HIV/AIDS initiative which required mandated state reporting of
individuals with AIDS, the inclusion of AIDS in quarantine and
isolation statutes, and a limitation on the occupations open to
afflicted individuals.29 Although unsuccessful, the LaRouche
initiative led to a series of similar initiatives addressing AIDS in
California.30
In the late 1980s, the Religious Right also innovated with a
new form of anti-gay ballot measure, the legal-restrictive
initiative. Legal-restrictive initiatives attempted to constrain
future legislation by limiting government support for
homosexuality or the possibility of passing LGBT rights
legislation in the future, along with typically eliminating any
existing protections. The Religious Right developed these
initiatives out of the failed Family Protection Act of 1981,
attempted federal legislation that included provisions for school
prayer, parental control over textbooks, traditional roles for
women, and prohibited the promotion or support of
homosexuality by the government.31 In the late 1980s, the
movement spearheaded campaigns to eliminate “special rights”
based on sexual orientation in the State of Washington, to
prohibit the promotion of homosexuality in the California cities of
Irvine, Concord, and Riverside, and to require voter approval for
LGBT rights laws in Maine, California, and Minnesota
(St. Paul).32 Few of these ballot measures made it on the ballot,
but their attempt demonstrates an increasing emphasis within
the Religious Right on proactive opposition to LGBT rights.
The two most infamous legal-restrictive initiatives are
Oregon Ballot Measure 933 and Colorado Amendment 2.34 The
GALLAGHER & BULL, supra note 17, at 25–30.
See Jay M. Kohorn, Petition for Extraordinary Relief: If the LaRouche AIDS
Initiative had Passed in California, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477, 490 (1986); see
also Christopher P. Toumey, Conjuring Medical Science: The 1986 Referendum on
AIDS/HIV Policy in California, 11 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 477, 488 (1997).
30 Mark Vandervelden, Californians Say “No on 64,” ADVOCATE, Dec. 9, 1986, at 10,
11; see also STONE, supra note 4, at 20.
31 See Thomas J. Burrows, Family Values: From the White House Conference on
Families to the Family Protection Act, in CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 336 (John D’Emilio et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter CREATING CHANGE].
See generally Karen Flax, Women’s Rights and the Proposed Family Protection Act,
36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141 (1981).
32 STONE, supra note 4, at 21.
33 Oregon Government Must Discourage Homosexuality, Measure 9 (1992),
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Government_Must_Discourage_Homosexuality,_
Measure_9_(1992) [http://perma.cc/2SBJ-8S2R].
34 Colorado No Protected Status for Sexual Orientation Amendment, Initiative 2 (1992),
28
29
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Oregon Citizen’s Alliance (OCA), led by vocal anti-gay activist
Lon Mabon, sponsored legal-restrictive initiatives in the Oregon
cities of Corvallis and Springfield in early 1992, which were test
cases for the statewide initiative in November 1992.35 Ballot
Measure 9 was one of the most extreme anti-gay initiatives in
that it would have eliminated all existing and future
nondiscrimination laws, along with requiring the firing of lesbian
and gay teachers in public schools (along with anyone openly
supportive of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer
rights), and the removal of all books approving of homosexuality
from public schools and libraries.36 Ultimately, Oregon voters
rejected Ballot Measure 9.37 In the same election year, the
organization Colorado for Family Values (CFV) sponsored
Amendment 2, a legalistic initiative that eliminated future and
existing gay rights laws in the state.38 CFV had originally
mobilized to defeat an ordinance in conservative Colorado
Springs. Colorado Amendment 2 distinguished between “true”
minorities and gays by using legal language about “protected
classes” and “minority status.”39 CFV innovated with a secular,
legalistic argument about LGBT rights that became widely used
by Religious Right campaigns across the country. This language
included a legalistic argument about how lesbian and gay rights
were “special rights” that usurped the rights of “true minorities”
like African Americans.40 Through this argument, the Religious
Right appealed to both voters who were ambivalent about civil
rights and African American community members.41 Colorado
voters passed Amendment 2,42 although it was quickly
challenged in the courts.43
In the next few years, the Religious Right disseminated the
legal-restrictive initiative across the United States. Mabon and
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_No_Protected_Status_for_Sexual_Orientation_
Amendment,_Initiative_2_(1992) [http://perma.cc/HW5G-Z5MF].
35 GALLAGHER & BULL, supra note 17, at 48–51.
36 See generally Elizabeth A. Tedesco, “Humanity on the Ballot”: The Citizen
Initiative and Oregon’s War over Gay Civil Rights, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 163 (2002).
37 Oregon Government Must Discourage Homosexuality, Measure 9 (1992), supra note 33.
38 HARDISTY, supra note 16, at 105. See generally LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B.
GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL (1998).
39 Colorado No Protected Status for Sexual Orientation Amendment, Initiative 2 (1992),
supra note 34; see also KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 38, at 3.
40 KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 38, at 133–58; Didi Herman, (Il)legitimate
Minorities: The American Christian Right’s Anti-gay Discourse, 23 J.L. & SOC’Y 346
passim (1996).
41 See Jean Hardisty & Amy Gluckman, The Hoax of “Special Rights”: The Right
Wing’s Attack on Gay Men and Lesbians, in HOMO ECONOMICS: CAPITALISM, COMMUNITY,
AND LESBIAN AND GAY LIFE 209, 218 (Amy Gluckman & Betsy Reed eds., 1997).
42 Colorado No Protected Status for Sexual Orientation Amendment, Initiative 2 (1992),
supra note 34.
43 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 38.
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the OCA persisted in sponsoring additional legal-restrictive
initiatives (often called “the son of 9”)44 at the state and town
levels for the next two years, passing these initiatives in over
thirty towns across the state.45 Religious Right affiliates across
the country collected petitions for imitation Amendment 2
initiatives, and an affiliate of the OCA sponsored a similar
initiative in Idaho, which the voters did not pass.46 The most
notable successful legal-restrictive initiative was the passage of
Issue 3 in Cincinnati in 1993.47
In 1996, the Supreme Court repealed Colorado Amendment 2
in Romer v. Evans.48 This ruling invalidated state
legal-restrictive initiatives but also affirmed the legitimacy of
sexual orientation as a minority-group category.49 This case set
an important precedent for future Supreme Court rulings,
including the abolition of sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas50 and
the establishment of same-sex marriage rights in United States
v. Windsor51 and Obergefell v. Hodges.52
Although Romer foreclosed the use of state legal-restrictive
initiatives, the success of these initiatives created tactical
repertoires of proactive opposition to LGBT rights that were
mobilized to oppose same-sex marriage. In the mid-1990s, many
legal-restrictive initiatives included a clause about prohibiting
same-sex marriage. Scholars Michael Dorf and Sidney Tarrow
argue that anti-gay activists engaged in anticipatory counter
mobilization, opposing same-sex marriage before it would be
realistically recognized by the courts or legislatures.53 After the
1993 Hawaii Supreme Court case, Baehr v. Lewin,54 the Religious
Right mobilized in anticipatory counter mobilization to pass the
Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)55 in 1996 and fifteen
See STONE, supra note 4, at 87.
See ARLENE STEIN, THE STRANGER NEXT DOOR: THE STORY OF A SMALL
COMMUNITY’S BATTLE OVER SEX, FAITH, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 27 (2001).
46 See Daniel Levin, The Constitution as Historical Symbol in Western Anti-gay
Rights Initiatives: The Case of Idaho, in ANTI-GAY RIGHTS: ASSESSING VOTER INITIATIVES
33, 36 (Stephanie L. Witt & Suzanne McCorkle eds., 1997).
47 See DUGAN, supra note 17, at 9–10.
48 Romer, 517 U.S. 620; see also JONATHAN GOLDBERG-HILLER, THE LIMITS TO
UNION: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS 22 (2002).
49 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632–36. However, municipal legal-restrictive ordinances
continued in the Midwest. See generally STONE, supra note 4.
50 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
51 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
52 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
53 See Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, Strange Bedfellows: How an Anticipatory
Countermovement Brought Same-Sex Marriage into the Public Arena, 39 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 449, 463 (2014).
54 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
55 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), declared
unconstitutional by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
44
45
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statutory DOMAs in states like Arizona, Georgia, Utah, Idaho,
and Michigan in 1995 and 1996.56 Similarly, after the
legalization of civil unions in Vermont in 1999 and same-sex
marriage in Massachusetts in 2004, the Religious Right
sponsored a series of state constitutional amendment initiatives
across the country to forbid same-sex marriages. The first
statewide ballot measures on same-sex marriage were in 1998 in
Alaska and Hawaii, two states where court cases had authorized
the possibility of legal same-sex marriage.57 Long before
same-sex marriage was legal in Massachusetts, the Religious
Right sponsored citizen initiatives or campaigned to support
legislatively-referred constitutional amendments on the ballot.
Some of these ballot measures were “super-DOMAs” that forbade
both same-sex marriage and broader relationships, such as
domestic partnerships and recognition rights.58 For over a
decade, the same-sex marriage ban was the Religious Right’s
most successful ballot measure tactic.59 Until 2012, voters passed
all bans except one, most by a large margin of support. The
LGBT movement struggled to defeat same-sex marriage bans due
to the lack of voter support for same-sex marriage, limited
movement resources, and inexperienced campaigns run in states
that rarely had ballot measures on LGBT rights, such as
Montana and Missouri.60
In early 2008, the California Supreme Court legalized
same-sex marriage, and Religious Right organizations quickly
collected petitions to put a constitutional amendment on the
ballot to ban same-sex marriage in the state. When Proposition 8
was voted on in November of 2008, more than 18,000 same-sex
marriages had already been conducted in the State of
California.61 There were two things that were historical about
California Proposition 8. First, the initiative was the first time
there were legal same-sex marriages conducted in a state that
would be rescinded by a ballot measure. Second, the size and

See Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 53, at 450.
See Kevin G. Clarkson et al., The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People’s
Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 213, 215 (1999); see also Goldberg-Hiller,
supra note 48, at 1.
58 See
Bayliss J. Camp, Mobilizing the Base and Embarrassing the
Opposition: Defense of Marriage Referenda and Cross-Cutting Electoral Cleavages,
51 SOC. PERSP. 713, 717 (2008).
59 See STONE, supra note 4, at 129–54.
60 Amy L. Stone, Winning for LGBT Rights, Losing for Same-Sex Marriage, in THE
MARRYING KIND? DEBATING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE WITHIN THE LESBIAN AND GAY
MOVEMENT 135, 161–62 (Mary Bernstein & Verta Taylor eds., 2013).
61 John Schwartz, California High Court Upholds Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES
(May 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/27marriage.html?_r=0 [http://per
ma.cc/ 45TU-5JVF].
56
57
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scale of the campaigns were remarkable. The Religious Right
campaign to pass Proposition 8 successfully defeated the largest
LGBT campaign in U.S. history, a campaign that dwarfed any
other ballot measure campaign that came before it. The passage
of Proposition 8 spurred protests across the country and the play
8 by Dustin Lance Black.62 Like Colorado Amendment 2, this
initiative was overruled as unconstitutional in the federal courts,
and California same-sex marriages resumed in June of 2013.63
The success of the Religious Right in passing same-sex
marriage bans was challenged in the 2012 elections. In 2012,
there were nine ballot measures: four municipal referendums on
nondiscrimination ordinances in Anchorage (Alaska), Royal Oak
(Michigan), and the Kansas towns of Salina and Hutchinson;
same-sex marriage bans in Minnesota and North Carolina;
referendums on same-sex marriage laws in Maryland and
Washington; and, a historical first, an initiative sponsored by the
LGBT community in Maine to legalize same-sex marriage.64
North Carolina voters passed a same-sex marriage ban in
May of 2012.65 After over a decade of successful same-sex
marriage bans, the LGBT movement won all four states in the
November 2012 election. In Minnesota, voters overturned a
same-sex marriage ban, which allowed the later legalization of
same-sex marriage in the state.66 In Maryland and Washington,
where the state legislatures had legalized same-sex marriage,
voters elected to retain the legislation through a referendum.67
And Maine voters legalized same-sex marriage through an
initiative.68 However, only the referendum in Royal Oak resulted
62 Jesse McKinley, Across U.S., Big Rallies for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/us/16protest.html [http://perma.cc/2BT23CT7]; AM. FOUND. FOR EQUAL RIGHTS, Why “8,” 8, http://www.8theplay.com/about-8/ (last
visited Dec. 19, 2015).
63 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
64 See Chart of 2012 Ballot Measure Issues, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/
Chart_of_2012_ballot_measure_issues [http://perma.cc/Y9NF-JNGH].
65 North Carolina Same-Sex Marriage, Amendment 1 (May 2012), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/North_Carolina_Same-Sex_Marriage,_Amendment_1_(May_2012)
[http://perma.cc/KQ9Y-BP9C].
66 Minnesota Same-Sex Marriage Amendment, Amendment 1 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/Minnesota_Same-Sex_Marriage_Amendment,_Amendment_1_%282
012%29 [http://perma.cc/Y43R-89YC].
67 Maryland Same-Sex Civil Marriage Referendum, Question 6 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/Maryland_Same-Sex_Civil_Marriage_Referendum,_Question_6_%28
2012%29 [http://perma.cc/D669-GTPR]; Washington Same-Sex Marriage Veto Referendum,
Referendum 74 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Same-Sex_
Marriage_Veto_Referendum,_Referendum_74_%282012%29 [http://perma.cc/Z3MG-LM75].
68 Maine Same-Sex Marriage Question, Question 1 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot
pedia.org/Maine_Same-Sex_Marriage_Question,_Question_1_(2012) [http://perma.cc/9HJZ39Q4].
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in the retention of a nondiscrimination ordinance; in the other
three cities, Religious Right scare tactics about transgender
women may have influenced voters’ decision.69
Obergefell forecloses any future marriage ban ballot
measures, but the Religious Right still mobilizes against state
and municipal nondiscrimination laws with ballot measures.70
Increasingly, these referendums focus on protections for gender
identity, making transgender rights central to Religious Right
campaigns.71
II. THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY
There are legal, social, and political questions about the
consequences of anti-gay ballot measures. Scholars have long
debated the merits of direct democracy itself, whether it is a
tyranny of the majority or an ideal form of citizen governance.
K.K. DuVivier likens the citizen-initiated ballot measure to a
“genie” being let out of bottle by the Progressive and Populist
movements that advocated for direct democracy.72 Activists
idealized these initiatives as a purer form of democracy that was
devoid of the special interests of representative democracy.
However, “unintended consequences arise from the genie
master’s ignorance rather than greed” in the case of citizen
voters.73 There are ongoing questions about whether ballot
measures reflect the will of the majority due to problems with
voter fatigue,74 voter turnout,75 voter education,76 and voter
confusion.77

69 Khalil AlHajal, Gay Rights Ordinance Passes in Royal Oak, MLIVE (Nov. 5, 2013,
9:30 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2013/11/gay_rights_ordinance_pas
ses_in.html [http://perma.cc/AD9P-CTNK]; William Yardley, Anchorage Voters Reject
Extension of Rights Protections to Gay Residents, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/us/proposition-5-gay-rights-anchorage-alaska.html.
70 Editorial, In Houston, Hate Trumps Fairness, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/opinion/in-houston-hate-trumped-fairness.html; Alan
Hickman, Gay and Lesbian Movement, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARK. HIST. & CULTURE,
http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=1177
[http://perma.cc/H9XE-NLXK].
71 See STONE, supra note 4, at 170.
72 K.K. DuVivier, Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REV.
1045 (2007).
73 Id. at 1050.
74 See Shaun Bowler et al., Ballot Propositions and Information Costs: Direct
Democracy and the Fatigued Voter, 45 W. POL. Q. 559 (1992).
75 See Caroline J. Tolbert el al., The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout in
the American States, 42 AM. POL. RES. 625 (2001).
76 See Michele S. Moses & Lauren P. Saenz, Hijacking Education Policy
Decisions: Ballot Initiatives and the Case of Affirmative Action, 78 HARV. EDUC. REV. 289
(2008).
77 See generally Elise Hofer, The Case for Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 4 J.L.
49 (2014).
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Many scholars contend that the referendum and initiative
processes can be tyrannical assertions of majority power over
minorities.78 In her early work, Barbara Gamble argues,
“Typically, civil rights laws seek to shift political power from the
majority to the minority, creating a conflict steeped in
self-interest. Thus, where the civil rights of a political minority
are at stake, the absence of the representative filter opens the
door to the tyranny.”79 Other scholars have argued that direct
democracy “uniquely facilitate[s] majoritarian oppression of
disfavored minority interests.”80 The main evidence for the
tyrannical nature of these measures is the frequency with which
voters reject civil rights at the ballot box. The low passage rate of
referendums on civil rights measures suggests that civil rights
measures fare poorly when subject to majority approval. The
passage rates are even more dramatic for anti-civil rights
initiatives, such as affirmative action bans, AIDS policies,
housing and public accommodations for racial minorities, English
language laws, and same-sex marriage bans.81 Three-quarters of
initiatives on these topics are enacted to restrict or eliminate
minority rights in some way.82 The exceptions to this pattern are
initiatives that focus on women’s issues such as women’s
suffrage, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), and reproductive
rights issues, in which the passage rate is similar to other forms
of citizen initiatives.83 The greater success of ballot measures on
women’s issues is partly a consequence of the demographic
prominence of women; comparatively, the first large-scale
government survey of sexual orientation, the National Health
Interview Survey, reported in July 2014, that less than three
percent of Americans identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual.84

78 See generally DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY
INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2004); Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, Direct
Democracy and Minority Rights: An Extension, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1020 (1998); Barbara
S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245 (1997); Donald
P. Haider-Markel et al., Lose, Win, or Draw? A Reexamination of Direct Democracy and
Minority Rights, 60 POL. RES. Q. 304 (2007); Daniel C. Lewis, Direct Democracy and
Minority Rights: Same-Sex Marriage Bans in the U.S. States, 92 SOC. SCI. Q. 364 (2011).
79 Gamble, supra note 78, at 248.
80 Hofer, supra note 77, at 57.
81 LYDIA CHAVEZ, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA’S BATTLE TO END AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION (1998); Jodi Miller, “Democracy in Free Fall:” The Use of Ballot Initiatives to
Dismantle State-Sponsored Affirmative Action Programs, 1999 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1.
82 Gamble, supra note 78, at 245.
83 THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 97–98 (1989).
84 Sandhya Somashekhar, Health Survey Gives Government Its First Large-Scale
Data on Gay, Bisexual Population, WASH. POST (July 15, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/national/health-science/health-survey-gives-government-its-first-large-scale-data
-on-gay-bisexual-population/2014/07/14/2db9f4b0-092f-11e4-bbf1-cc51275e7f8f_story.html
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Ballot measures on LGBT rights require the strong support of
heterosexual allies in order to pass.
The tyrannical aspects of direct democracy have led to the
call for stricter pre-ballot and post-ballot judicial review of ballot
measures,85 along with harsher requirements for initiative
petition collecting. Historically, the LGBT movement has
effectively used both pre- and post-ballot judicial review to
subvert direct democracy. In her book Out of the Closets and into
the Courts, Ellen Ann Andersen traces the history of judicial
challenges to anti-gay ballot measures from 1974 to 2003.86
National organizations, like Lambda Legal, and local campaigns
alike, have systematically filed pre-ballot legal challenges, which
led to the deterrence of multiple legal-restrictive initiatives in the
1990s.87 Some of the most tyrannical ballot measures have been
deflected before petition collection and voting. Additionally, two
extreme forms of anti-gay initiatives—legal-restrictive initiatives
and same-sex marriage bans—have been overturned by
post-ballot judicial review.88 Other ballot measures—such as
referendums on municipal nondiscrimination laws—typically do
not foreclose political actors from passing said legislation again
in the future.89 Thus, the high passage rate of anti-gay ballot
measures is mitigated by pre- and post-ballot legal challenges.
However, post-ballot legal challenges may be successful years or
decades after an anti-gay initiative, leaving residents of that city
or state with anti-gay laws and policies in the meantime.
This literature on the tyrannical nature of anti-gay ballot
measures focused disproportionately on the constitutionality of
initiatives during pre-ballot judicial review, the high passage
rate of ballot measures as evidence for tyranny, and broader

[http://perma.cc/M6U9-ECT3].
85 Hofer, supra note 77, at 52. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, Not
“Sleeping,” Giant: The Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on Latina/o and
Immigrant Communities, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (2008); Anya J. Stein, The Guarantee
Clause in the States: Structural Protections for Minority Rights and Necessary Limits on
the Initiative Power, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 343 (2009).
86 ANDERSEN, supra note 18.
87 Id. at 143–74; STONE, supra note 4, at 63–90.
88 See ANDERSEN, supra note 1887.
89 Indeed it is common for the same city to have multiple referendums over a period
of decades about these nondiscrimination ordinances. For example, Houston, Texas, had
two referendums in January of 1985 on nondiscrimination protections, a vote on domestic
partnerships in 2001, and a vote on a nondiscrimination ordinance in 2015. Ferndale,
Michigan, had three separate referendums and initiatives on nondiscrimination
ordinances in November 1991, February 2000, and November 2006. In the final
referendum, a nondiscrimination ordinance was passed. Cincinnati, Ohio, had a legal
restrictive initiative in 1993 and a vote to rescind the legal restrictive initiative in 2006.
Miami-Dade, Florida, had referendums on nondiscrimination ordinances in 1977, 1978,
and 2002.
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philosophical questions about whether or not referendums and
initiatives allow for a tyranny of the majority. This Article
presses this question of tyranny further, to examine the
extra-legal consequences of said ballot measures. Even if direct
democracy does not result in a negative legal outcome, I argue
that there are extra-legal consequences due to the campaigning
by the Religious Right and LGBT movement.
III. EXTRA-LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
Beyond sociolegal questions about the democratic nature of
anti-gay ballot measures, there are extra-legal ramifications for
the LGBT community and individuals who live in municipalities
or states experiencing a ballot measure. From the drain on
community monetary resources to the exacerbation of secondary
marginalization within the LGBT movement, these referendums
and initiatives have consequences at the local, state, and
national levels. Many scholars document the psychological toll for
lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals experiencing a local
anti-gay ballot measure.90 Some of these community, movement,
and individual consequences can be productive; anti-gay
campaigns result in new community organizations, escalated
mobilization within the movement, and stronger voting habits.
However, most anti-gay ballot measures produce negative
outcomes for the LGBT community, movement, and individuals.
First, I focus on how the LGBT community in a particular
city or state is impacted by a local ballot measure. Large-scale,
organized campaigns must be mobilized to fight anti-gay ballot
measures. Consistently, lesbian and gay ballot measure
campaigns struggle with marshalling enough resources and
funding to run successful campaigns.91 Ballot measure
campaigns are frequently unanticipated, have to be mobilized
quickly, and require much funding. The campaign to fight
Proposition 8, the same-sex marriage initiative in California in
90 Unfortunately, little of this work has included transgender individuals. Given the
increase in anti-transgender ballot measures and the increasing use of anti-transgender
framing by Religious Right campaigns, future work should include transgender
individuals in studies of the impact of anti-LGBT animus. See Ellen D.B. Riggle et al.,
Marriage Amendments and Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Individuals in the 2006 Election,
6 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 80 (2009); Sharon Scales Rostosky et al., Lesbian, Gay,
and Bisexual Individuals’ Psychological Reactions to Amendments Denying Access to Civil
Marriage, 80 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 302 (2010) [hereinafter Rostosky, Psychological
Reactions]; Sharon Scales Rostosky et al., Marriage Amendments and Psychological
Distress in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual (LGB) Adults, 56 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 56
(2009); Glenda M. Russell & Jeffrey A. Richards, Stressor and Resilience Factors for
Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals Confronting Antigay Politics, 31 AM. J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOL. 313 (2003).
91 See STONE, supra note 4, at 133–35.
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2008, spent $43.3 million, shattering campaign-spending records
and outspending most gubernatorial campaigns.92 The
Proposition 8 campaign spent more money than the combined
funds of twenty-four other campaigns to fight same-sex marriage
bans in other states.93 Although some of these funds were raised
from out-of-state contributors, anti-gay ballot measures are a
direct financial strain on the communities in which they take
place.94 This demand for resources in ballot measure campaigns
can draw resources away from LGBT community non-profit
organizations, health organizations, community centers, and
businesses, along with other ongoing activist projects and
Democratic candidates.95 The funds raised during ballot measure
campaigns do not result in long term products for the local
community; these funds often disappear into thin air as political
ads or consulting fees rather than fueling durable community
organizations. Oftentimes, even the political ads crafted to fight
the ballot measure do not change public opinion about LGBT
issues. In the 2000s, polling consultants advised many marriage
ban campaigns to run political ads that did not focus on same-sex
marriage. Instead, campaigns ran ads focusing on the damaging
impact of revising the state constitution.96 One campaign
organizer remarked, “We spent a quarter of a million dollars on a
big ad buy [about the constitution] and still lost with thirty
percent of the vote. In the months following the campaign I really
thought about the benefits of a gay-positive ad, that the
community would have been better off.”97
In addition to financial resources, successful campaigns have
to engage in mass mobilization of leaders and volunteers. In each
state with such marriage bans, including states like Arkansas
and Louisiana, the LGBT community had to mobilize a response
to the Religious Right.98 Organizers of inexperienced campaigns
complained that it diverted local movement resources away from
ongoing projects like anti-bullying or anti-violence laws and
instead focused activist energy on same-sex marriage.99 Even a
municipal ballot measure may require over 10,000 volunteers to
make phone calls, do door-to-door canvassing to talk to voters,
92 Justin Ewers, California Same-Sex Marriage Initiative Campaigns Shatter
Spending Records, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 29, 2008, 1:06 PM), http://www.us
news.com/news/national/articles/2008/10/29/california-same-sex-marriage-initiative-cam
paigns-shatter-spending-records [http://perma.cc/JHB8-HU7R].
93 STONE, supra note 4, at xiii.
94 Id. at 71–72, 134–35.
95 Id. at xxvii.
96 Id. at 145.
97 Id.
98 Stone, supra note 60.
99 STONE, supra note 4, at 133.
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put up yard signs, and organize rallies. This requires the
mobilization of heterosexual volunteers as well as broad
community coalitions. In cities where the ballot measure is a
referendum response to a passed nondiscrimination ordinance,
there is typically an existing organization or coalition of
individuals who worked to pass the nondiscrimination
ordinance.100 This organization frequently mobilizes to run a
campaign when the ordinance is challenged in a referendum.
When the Religious Right engages in proactive opposition by
proposing anti-gay initiatives or constitutional amendments, the
LGBT movement has to mobilize in new and unexpected ways. In
her study of an anti-gay initiative in Timbertown, a small town
in Oregon targeted by the OCA in the 1990s, sociologist Arlene
Stein documents the mobilization that had to happen in a town
with no pre-existing LGBT organizations.101 Progressive locals
met in private homes, worked with no paid staff, and engaged in
a personal campaign with their neighbors.102 When Louisiana
had a legislative-initiated constitutional amendment to ban
same-sex marriage, LGBT organizers in the state had never
coordinated a statewide campaign of any kind.103 The marriage
ban required the formation of a statewide coalition and new
social networks between organizers.104 These requirements for
mobilization can serve the LGBT community in the long term. In
Louisiana and other states with marriage bans, this mobilization
frequently extends past the campaign into the formation of
statewide LGBT rights organizations that work throughout the
year on state legislative issues or protests. In 2010, one-fifth of
all existing statewide LGBT rights organizations were founded as
a result of marriage ban campaigns or other ballot measures.105
Other kinds of organizing can also result from these campaigns.
After Colorado Amendment 2 passed in 1992, new chapters of
Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) began across
the state, public libraries increased their holdings of LGBT
books, and a task force to address the climate for LGBT
individuals on campus was created at the University of Colorado
at Boulder.106
See generally id.
STEIN, supra note 45, at 16–18.
Id. at 17–18.
Telephone Interview with Randy Evans, Political Director, Forum for Equality
(May 7, 2010).
104 Id.
105 STONE, supra note 4, at xxiv–xxv, 135. See generally Donald P. Haider-Markel,
Lesbian and Gay Politics in the States, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 290 (Craig
Rimmerman et al. eds., 2000) (describing how threatening the gay community can
incentivize formation of new gay organizations).
106 Glenda M. Russell et al., Trauma, Recovery, and Community: Perspectives on the
100
101
102
103
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These campaigns are often mobilized to fail. In areas where
LGBT rights are unpopular, even the most diligent LGBT
campaign cannot succeed. For example, even the most effective
campaign to fight same-sex marriage bans failed until there was
a dramatic shift in public opinion about same-sex marriage.107
This situation, in which LGBT organizers and volunteers work
tirelessly for a campaign that loses, can be demoralizing and
challenging. At the end of a campaign, particularly a losing
campaign, there may be little to show for all the effort put in by
activists.
This intensified mobilization can dramatize inter-community
conflicts, particularly secondary marginalization, city-rural
differences, movement ideological division, and racial coalition
building.108 Campaigns require a level of consensus about tactics
that can be challenging for any social movement, but particularly
challenging for one as diverse as the LGBT movement. These
campaigns tend to increase movement dissent and marginalize
direct action and queer activism.109 Queer activism challenges
campaign work by advocating for the importance of proud,
diverse representations of the LGBT community. In many
campaigns, if LGBT lives are represented at all, they are
typically white, gender-normative, middle-class gay men or
lesbians in monogamous relationships. In so representing the
LGBT community, diversity within the movement is stifled and
community members who are less palatable to mainstream
voters—such as drag queens, transgender women, or
leathermen—are hidden from view.110 In addition, there are
frequently tensions over racial coalition building during ballot
measure
campaigns
that
exacerbate
existing
racial
marginalization within the LGBT movement.111 In her study of
multiple statewide referendums and initiatives in Maine,
Kimberly Simmons elaborates on the divisions between
strategies deployed in rural and urban organizing against ballot
measures.112 Specifically, activists in rural areas chafed under
the directives of the statewide campaign, which was often housed
in an urban area and used tactics that worked better in cities.
Beyond the immediate community, anti-gay ballot measures
impact the trajectory of the LGBT movement. Scholars have studied
Long-Term Impact of Anti-LGBT Politics, TRAUMATOLOGY, June 2011, at 14, 20.
107 STONE, supra note 4, at 132.
108 Id. at 155–78; DUGAN, supra note 17.
109 STONE, supra note 4, at 85.
110 Id. at 155–78.
111 Id. at 166.
112 KIMBERLY CLARKE SIMMONS, GRASSROOTS GOES TO THE POLLS: CITIZEN
INITIATIVES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 342 (2002).
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the relationship between the LGBT movement and the Religious
Right as a classic example of a movement-countermovement
dynamic. Movements and countermovements operate in a
sustained, oppositional relationship in which one movement
impacts the other by making contested claims about similar
subjects of concern.113 Countermovements may alter the framing
of social issues, create new social institutions, or generally shape
movement tactics and strategies.114 In her book, How the
Religious Right Shaped Lesbian and Gay Activism,115 sociologist
Tina Fetner documents the continual impact of the Religious
Right on the LGBT movement. Fetner argues that the Religious
Right has “affected lesbian and gay activists’ choices of which
issues to rally around and which issues to put on the back
burner. It has blocked or reversed the implementation of policies
that would benefit lesbians and gay men.”116
Although the campaigns operate on the municipal or state
level, anti-gay ballot measures divert movement resources on the
national level. Most notably, national LGBT organizations such
as the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force (Task Force) provide campaign startup
funds, train campaign leaders, strategize about campaign tactics,
and invest the time and energy of paid staff members to help run
campaigns.117 This energy can divert movement resources from
other activist causes. Escalated mobilization of the Religious
Right in sponsoring ballot measures like legal-restrictive
initiatives and marriage bans had a strong impact on national

113 David S. Meyer & Suzanne Staggenborg, Movements, Countermovements, and the
Structure of Political Opportunity, 101 AM. J. SOC. 1628, 1631 (1996); Mayer N. Zald
& Bert Useem, Movement and Countermovement Interaction: Mobilization, Tactics and
State Involvement, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 247, 247–48
(Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 1987).
114 See generally Nancy Whittier, The Consequences of Social Movements for Each
Other, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 531 (David A. Snow et al.
eds., 2004) (discussing women’s movements and the successive countermovements that
followed from their influence); Kenneth T. Andrews, Movement-Countermovement
Dynamics and the Emergence of New Institutions: The Case of “White Flight” Schools in
Mississippi, 80 SOC. FORCES 911 (2002) (analyzing the creation of “private segregationist
academies” that developed in the U.S. South after court-ordered desegregation); Dawn
McCaffrey & Jennifer Keys, Competitive Framing Processes in the Abortion
Debate: Polarization-Vilification, Frame Saving, and Frame Debunking, 41 SOC. Q. 41
(2000) (investigating how social movements regarding abortion frame their arguments in
a competitive response to countermovements); Deana A. Rohlinger, Framing the Abortion
Debate: Organizational Resources, Media Strategies, and Movement-Countermovement
Dynamics, 43 SOC. Q. 479 (2002) (studying social movements’ framing literature
regarding abortion and how they create media frames and packages in response to their
opposition).
115 FETNER, supra note 17.
116 Id. at xv.
117 STONE, supra note 4, at 142.
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organizations and the direction of the movement.118 In the 1990s,
the Task Force developed a program called Fight the Right,
which was criticized by organization board member and gay
historian John D’Emilio as “thoroughly reactive, completely
dependent on what one’s political opponents did rather than on
what queer communities wanted or needed.”119 Some election
cycles completely diverted the energy of national organizations.
In the November 2004 election, eleven states faced same-sex
marriage bans; most of these bans were legislatively referred
initiatives and occurred in states like Oklahoma,120 Georgia,121
and Kentucky,122 where the LGBT community had never fought a
ballot measure. National organization staff members spent time
and funding training campaigns leaders in all eleven states, and
they triaged Oregon as the state most likely to be victorious.123
Beyond the effect on the community and movement, anti-gay
ballot measures have dramatic psychological impacts not only on
individuals involved in campaigns, but also lesbian, gay, and
bisexual individuals in the broader community. Religious Right
campaigns often rely on existing homophobia or transphobia in
public opinion in order to win a campaign.124 Early Religious
Right campaigns relied on messaging about gay men as sexual
predators, which was transformed in the 1990s into legalistic
arguments about “special rights.”125 Same-sex marriage ban
campaigns often emphasize the benefits of children having one
mother and one father, along with the sanctity of marriage and
concerns about the teaching of same-sex marriage in elementary
schools.126 Since the late 1990s, increasingly Religious Right
campaigns to rescind municipal nondiscrimination laws include
arguments
about
transgender
individuals,
specifically
transgender women. These arguments frame transgender women
as “men in dresses” trying to invade the bathrooms of women and

Id. at 63–90, 129–54.
John D’Emilio, Organizational Tales: Interpreting the NGLTF Story, in CREATING
CHANGE, supra note 31, at 469, 485.
120 Oklahoma Definition of Marriage, State Question 711 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/Oklahoma_Definition_of_Marriage,_State_Question_711_(2004)
[http://perma.cc/M937-ND3V].
121 Georgia Marriage Amendment, Question 1 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot
pedia.org/Georgia_Marriage_Amendment,_Question_1_(2004) [http://perma.cc/9HZ4-7XR4].
122 Kentucky Marriage Amendment (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/
Kentucky_Marriage_Amendment_(2004) [http://perma.cc/SV94-H86N].
123 STONE, supra note 4, at 134.
124 Patrick McCreery, Save Our Children/Let Us Marry: Gay Activists Appropriate
the Rhetoric of Child Protectionism, RADICAL HIST. REV., Winter 2008, at 186; see also
HERMAN, supra note 14.
125 HARDISTY, supra note 16, at 112; HERMAN, supra note 14, at 47–48.
126 STONE, supra note 4, at 36–37.
118
119
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children.127 The proliferation of these homophobic and
transphobic arguments can be psychologically painful for LGBT
residents and create a hostile and at times dangerous community
to live in.
The evidence for negative psychological impacts is
overwhelming and extends beyond the legal outcome of the vote
to the campaign experience itself. Although there is some
evidence that these campaigns mobilize lesbian, gay, and
bisexual individuals to vote more often,128 to fight for justice and
equal rights,129 and to publicly disclose their sexuality,130 most
research uncovers negative psychological and behavioral impacts.
Multiple studies demonstrate that the experience of a local
anti-gay campaign is stressful for gay, lesbian, and bisexual
residents of a city or state.131 Studies show that contentious
same-sex marriage ballot measures contribute to increased
minority stress among lesbian, gay, and bisexual state residents
and heightened awareness of anti-gay activity.132 Surveys taken
right before the vote on California Proposition 8 showed high
levels of anger and deleterious impacts on personal and familial
relationships.133 The anti-gay rhetoric of campaigns can lead to
high rates of fear, creation of stress due to community divisions,
heightened awareness of anti-gay activity, and an increase in
internalized homophobia.134 These psychological effects extend
beyond LGBT individuals to their family members, who may
experience heightened stress and concern for lesbian and gay
people in their lives.135
The impact of the passage of an anti-gay law also leads to
negative psychological effects. Some of the most detailed work
has been conducted by scholar Glenda Russell and her colleagues
about the effects of Colorado Amendment 2. A longitudinal study
of lesbian, gay, and bisexual residents of Colorado during the
127 Id. at 28; see also Laurel Westbrook & Kristen Schilt, Doing Gender, Determining
Gender: Transgender People, Gender Panics, and the Maintenance of the Sex/Gender/
Sexuality System, 28 GENDER & SOC’Y 32, 37 (2014) (discussing the construction of gender
panics about transgender women).
128 See Riggle et al., supra note 90.
129 Rostosky, Psychological Reactions, supra note 90, at 307.
130 KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 39, at 233.
131 Riggle et al., supra note 90, at 86; Rostosky, Psychological Reactions, supra note
90, at 305.
132 Rostosky et al., supra note 90, at 62; Russell & Richards, supra note 90, at 316.
133 Natalya C. Maisel & Adam W. Fingerhut, California’s Ban on Same-Sex
Marriage: The Campaign and its Effects on Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Individuals,
67 J. SOC. ISSUES 242, 253 (2011).
134 Russell & Richards, supra note 90, at 316–22.
135 Sharon G. Horne et al., Impact of Marriage Restriction Amendments on Family
Members of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Individuals: A Mixed-Method Approach,
67 J. SOC. ISSUES 358, 370–71 (2011).
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legal-restrictive initiative Amendment 2 suggests that the
harmful effects of said ballot measures may persist decades after
the initiative.136 More recently, psychologists have found that
living in states with instituted bans on same-sex marriage
increases the probability of lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals
having psychiatric issues, including anxiety, mood disorders, and
alcohol use.137
CONCLUSION
The history of anti-gay ballot measures extends beyond
same-sex marriage bans to the first referendums on municipal
nondiscrimination ordinances in the 1970s. Legal-restrictive
initiatives and same-sex marriage bans have been the most
systematic, proactive uses of the initiative process by the
Religious Right and have resulted in anti-gay laws and policies
that were overturned in the courts. Although both forms of ballot
measures have been outlawed by the courts, the Religious Right
still persists in sponsoring referendums against municipal
ordinances or laws that support LGBT rights. These Religious
Right campaigns have become increasingly anti-transgender as
the support of lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals has shifted
with the legalization of same-sex marriage.
Although legal scholars have disproportionately focused on
the question of whether ballot measures about civil rights are
tyrannical, there has been less attention paid to the extra-legal
consequences of these referendums and initiatives. Most of the
research on extra-legal consequences has been conducted in the
fields of sociology and psychology, not political science or law.
This research demonstrates that the extra-legal consequences for
anti-gay measures are mostly negative and impact the
community and individuals directly affected by the referendum
or initiative in question, along with the broader trajectory of the
LGBT movement. Regardless of the outcome of said measures,
the experiences of living in a community with an anti-gay
campaign and working on a ballot measure campaign may
themselves be challenging for LGBT individuals. When
considering the tyrannical aspects of ballot measures, this Article
pushes scholars to move beyond analyzing just the rate of
passage of said measures and instead suggests that the
extra-legal impact of these referendums and initiatives may be
just as important.
Russell et al., supra note 106, at 17–18.
Mark L. Hatzenbuehler et al., The Impact of Institutional Discrimination on
Psychiatric Disorders in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Populations: A Prospective Study, 100
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 452, 454 (2010).
136
137
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This research calls for a holistic understanding of the impact
of ballot measures about civil rights on gender, racial, and sexual
minority group members. Other researchers have documented
the consequences of these ballot measures for other minority
group members, including disenfranchisement.138 Like other
scholars, I echo the need for more stringent judicial review of
ballot measures affecting civil rights before these referendums
and initiatives go before voters. The extreme extra-legal
consequences of these ballot measures for LGBT individuals,
communities, and movements should be included during judicial
review as part of the potential harm of said initiatives. Although
judges are often deferential to the “will of the people,” the
complex, layered majoritarian tyranny that is part of anti-gay
ballot measures should be considered as a reasonable
justification to restrict these referendum and initiatives.

138 See generally Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection
of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982) (discussing the origins of the political process and
the difficulty that minorities have in participating); Johnson, supra note 85 (focusing on
the effect of ballot measures on the latino/a community and discussing their difficulty in
engaging in the political process).
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